Friday 21 April 2017

Why Millennials are backing Marine Le Pen and breaking with their past

France’s presidential election is now looming and the heat of the contest shows no sign of abating. Marine Le Pen, Emmanuel Macron and, more recently, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, have positioned themselves as three political outsiders in serious contention, but only a brave man would rule out the former clear-favourite, François Fillon.

Amidst the sound and fury of barbed televised debates, swinging opinion polls and grandstanding political commentary, an extraordinary event is approaching, according to the latest predictions: the young people of France may come out in majority for Front National. This would be hugely unexpected for two reasons: it would go against the grain of millennial behaviour in recent votes across Europe and North America; and also it would be a seismic shift from their track record in past French elections.

That is what the daily polls from Ifop-Fiducial[1] are suggesting, with as many as one in three under-30s set to tick Marine Le Pen’s ballot box on 23rd April. This would seem very much a plausible outcome given the 2015 regional elections, in which more young voters turned out for Front National than any other party.

In absence of any particularly ground-breaking economic policy, it appears that Le Pen’s tough stance on immigration, the EU, terrorism and cultural identity is attracting a level of support from Millennials never before seen by her party. To find out why this narrative is proving so tractable with this demographic, we must understand the circumstances and outlook of the youth of France.

Since booting the Socialist Party (SP) out in 1995, France thrice elected a right wing president, each time veering closer and closer back to the SP before ultimately voting in Hollande in 2012. Young people were integral to this, as they were in Chirac’s decimation of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 2002 second round. We can clearly see, then, that young French people voted in line with our expectations for this age group in the past 20 years.

The unemployment rate in France is currently just under 10%, a beacon of Hollande’s economic failures throughout his tenure, as it was 9.4% at the beginning of 2012. The youth unemployment rate, however, is 26[2]%. That puts it 7th highest in the EU, behind the likes of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus. Monthly wage growth has fallen from 0.8% to 0.2% in the same period[3]. In short, the 2012 vote for change has not brought any profound improvements to the financial livelihoods of young French people.

Just as across the rest of Europe, young people are facing the brunt of these ramifications: bleak job prospects, high income tax, and stagnant wages. Front National might not have any inspiring economic silver bullets but, as far as the young are concerned, neither do the established right or left. They have tried them both, and neither have been good enough. And although the current candidates are new people with new policies, the case of Labour in the UK shows just how difficult it is to shake off an image of economic ineptitude.

Le Pen’s economic policies, then, are probably not winning the attention of Millennials, but neither are they losing it. Lacking any considerable competition on this front from the other runners, her approach to the EU, terrorism and national identity are proving significant in her party’s newfound youth support base.

As a colonial power, France has a long history with issues of identity and the consequences of becoming a globalised nation. As with the British Empire, the full ramifications were only fully felt once imperial breakdown had begun. The 1954-62 Algerian War of Independence was especially consequential, as violence in Africa caused an exodus of one million European settlers back to France. According to sociologist Éric Fassin, their sense of embitterment would form the bedrock of the far right for years to come[4].

But a colonial past can only explain why France might be generally vulnerable to nativist tendencies pervading politics. It cannot explain why this is maturing into widespread support for Marine Le Pen in 2017.

The most obvious factor which differentiates this election from previous ones is the recent increase in terrorist attacks, as well as the likely threat of more. These stoke nativist concerns, and, to put it cynically, collaborate with Le Pen’s hard-line anti-immigration views. She has a history of shaping the raging debate over Islam in France: earlier in the campaign, she caused a storm by claiming that French schoolchildren were being fed halal meat covertly. Politicians of all parties spent the ensuing two days debating the issue, straddling the precarious line between desisting from Islamophobia and appearing unsympathetic to genuine worries regarding religion. This of course all played into Le Pen’s hands, who seemed the only person truly protecting French interests, regardless of whether her claims were even true. Crucial to her growing popularity, each subsequent Islamist terrorist attack adds credibility to her fears. And fear is contagious.

But there is a flaw in seeing anti-immigration/terrorism as the fulcrum upon which all her success turns. Such scaremongering about the threat posed by Islam to the essence and safety of Europe did not win over Millennials in the Austrian elections, or the Dutch ones, or the Brexit referendum (as a Leave campaign poster attempted to conflate migration from the Middle East with the EU’s open border policy). Undoubtedly, terrorism will push some in the direction of the figure pledging to tackle it most earnestly, especially as France has suffered more attacks in the last few years than any other country in Europe. Nonetheless, fear grips all Europeans in present times, whether your nation has faced one, multiple, or no attacks. Yet it does not appear that this was significant enough to make young voters break from their typically liberal values elsewhere, so it is unlikely that this is the sole reason behind their new allegiance to the far right in France.

More broadly, Front National has taken ownership of national identity and, by championing it, champions her own claim to be its true defender. The fragility of this concept in French minds has been witnessed many times before Marine Le Pen’s emergence: the 2005 Clichy-sous-Bois riots; Sarkozy’s presidential quest to find and define the ‘French identity’; even the opening line of Charles de Gaulle’s memoirs – “All my life I’ve had a certain idea France” – all placed ‘L’identité francaise’ at the forefront of the French psyche.

The fact that the concept of ‘Français de souche’ (literally “French of root” – French people whose ancestry derives from European roots) has grown in prominence over this campaign is a testament to the influence which the far right has had. In an interview on secularism, Marine Le Pen has claimed that “France is still unquestionably a country of Christian roots”, implying that Muslim culture is simply incompatible with French/European civilisation. Such sentiments, combining paranoia and national solidarity in a society so fissiparous, are clearly proving potent amongst all people, including the young.

The Front National has crucially strengthened its credibility through its dédiabolisation process – literally ‘de-devilment’. Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine’s father and the notoriously xenophobic founder of the party, was evicted in an ingenious public relations feat. Furthermore, nobody can doubt the commitment of a leader prepared to kick their own father out of the party to help the cause. In addition, Marine has placed much emphasis on the feminist side of her character, a nod to those who might feel uneasy about her social virtues.

Le Pen’s unprecedented and devastatingly successful campaign with the under-30s appears a concoction of fortuitous and concerted factors. Her ability to structure the debate as a choice between pursuing quixotic values and intangible humanitarian duties, and tackling the very real threats to the security and identity of France, is fundamental. Whilst young people do tend to have a stronger sense of social justice, they are also stereotypically more impressionable and susceptive to convincing leadership. Purifying the party brand (as much as a far right, nativist party realistically can) has enabled Le Pen to reach out to social moderates whom her father could only alienate.

All of this adds to the uninspiring campaigns of the traditional parties, and the inescapable reality that France’s economy is failing its people, especially its youth, who are now faced with a life of bleak prospects. Millennials might just see 2017 as a chance to roll the dice and demand a radical change in direction at the polling station.


[1] http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-election-fn-youths-idUKKBN16L139
[2] https://www.statista.com/statistics/266228/youth-unemployment-rate-in-eu-countries/
[3] http://www.tradingeconomics.com/france/wage-growth
[4] Radio 4 Podcast “France and Race: A Question of Identite”, 10/04/2012

Wednesday 19 April 2017

Theresa May’s Trigger Happy U-turns


Today, in an 11.15am special statement, Theresa May announced that she will be calling a snap General Election on 8th June. Following the expected parliamentary approval of a two thirds majority, the United Kingdom is destined to have its first snap election since Margaret Thatcher’s victory over Labour in 1979.

As with any significant political event, there will be (indeed already is) a plethora of analysis, commentary and speculation. Why did Theresa May choose to call one now? Why did she previously reject rumours of a snap election? How will Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour leader in dire straits, fare? Will we see a resurgence of the Lib Dems behind the Brexit-sceptic banner of Tim Farron? How will the EU negotiators view this development: as a sign of May’s insecurity; or a confident bid to bolster her national support?

Amidst all the sound and fury and focus on these issues, however, something very different struck me at first. Incredibly, Theresa May has U-turned yet again.

This is now proving to be a rather common occurrence in the May tenure. In November, the government performed a double reversal of education policy. The first abandoned its “education for all” bill, just after it had been included in the most recent Queen’s speech at the time. Quickly afterwards, May doubled-back on plans to introduce new grammar schools in the autumn of last year. With a fresh batch currently on the horizon, you would not be blamed for waiting until the bricks are actually delivered, and the cement mixed, before believing that this is actually going to go ahead.
More infamous, of course, was Philip Hammond’s (and by surrogate, that of Theresa May) miraculous decision to reverse changes to self-employment tax the day after he announced them in Spring Budget. It was almost as if he had to hear the words come out of his own mouth to realise that he did not like the sound of them after all.

These are just a few examples of many. In fact, Theresa May recorded an impressive five U-turns in her first three months of government (as cited by Guido Fawkes here).


If Theresa May did road signs...

All of this begs the question: why? How can this come from a politician once considered so conservative and cautious that her former boss, David Cameron, dubbed her “Submarine May”? If you have ever watched House of Cards, or The West Wing, you will have seen how much deliberation goes into even the smallest decisions and announcements in the world of politics. For somebody so experienced to make this many ill-conceived blunders is simply unbelievable.
It is more likely, then, that this tactical U-turning is not really blundering at all. Perhaps May likes to test the waters when it comes to policy-making. Perhaps, much like Elizabeth I in the echo chambers of William Cecil and Robert Dudley, there are so many clashing views within her entourage that, sometimes, she backs the wrong horse. Perhaps she is just extremely wary of her small parliamentary majority.

Whichever it might be, all of these hypotheses have one underlying trend: an abject disregard of any risk posed by the Labour party. The danger of being decimated for fluctuation by the left-of-centre press is mitigated by Corbyn’s own enormous problems. It is a testament to May’s dominance over Corbyn that her spectacular reversals are being heralded in the media as moments of judicious, candid consideration, rather than those of a flustered PM under constant fire from a competent Opposition.

Criticism from Corbyn at Prime Minister’s Questions is all too easy to bat away by turning the tables. Grammar schools have been indisputably proven to benefit the wealthy? You can’t unite your own party, let alone the country. The government’s callous disregard for its refugee commitments to vulnerable children is a blemish on the nation? You lost a seat you held for 70 years in a by-election which was only the fourth time since the Second World War that the government has won a seat in one.

It is true that Corbyn has let May off the hook over glaringly perilous situations, such as regarding refugees, crippling benefits cuts and an NHS in rigor mortis. But the truth is that against her easy ad hominem victories there is little defence. Like any argumentum ad populum, the more Theresa May recites the already-established public opinion that Corbyn and Labour are incompetent, the more immutable that reputation becomes. It is fatally perpetuating for the Opposition’s woes, and it covers up Theresa May’s cracks effectively too.

All of this bodes ill for Corbyn in the run up to 8th June. Theresa May has him in a rut and keeps pushing him further and further down. It also all makes the PM's decision to hold this election unsurprising. In her moment of Homeric omnipotence, a resounding victory would surely be the garlic-laden nail hammered into the Corbyn coffin. Brief embarrassment over occassional U-turns seems cheap purchase for this.

Tuesday 18 April 2017

Next Gen voting behaviour I: How are Millennials voting?

Posted temporarily on the content manager's blog due to technical issues on our website, this is Horizons' first article in a three-part series investigating contemporary millennial voting behaviour.
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Most people will be familiar with the truism that young people tend to sit on the lift of the political spectrum, and gradually move right as they get older. So established is this idea that it has its own maxim - "Any man who is not a socialist at age 20 has no heart. Any man who is still a socialist at age 40 has no head" - which has been attributed to Winston Churchill, Benjamin Disraeli, Georges Clemenceau, Francois Guizot and more.
Statistics from the British Election Study show that there is indeed some truth to this generalisation. This graph plots voting trends by age in five elections within the past 50 years.

Graph source: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/03/do-we-become-more-conservative-with-age-young-old-politics

Indeed, the voting habits of Millennials in recent elections and referenda across the West have largely stayed true to form. 68% of 18-34 year olds voted Remain in the British referendum on leaving the EU[1], whilst the vast majority of the Dutch Green Party’s 7000 new members are under-30 years old[2]. The ‘Schulz Effect’ in Germany seems to be seizing the support of a new surge of left-wing young voters ahead of the upcoming federal elections and, across the Atlantic in November’s American presidential election, 18-29 year olds favoured Clinton over Trump by a decisive margin of 55%-37%[3]. This would appear ample evidence that millennial voting behaviour is in-keeping with our expectations.

Efforts have been made to explain this, although it is always difficult to rationalise sociological habits on such a largescale. Initially, the possibility of voting patterns depending on generation was considered; perhaps growing up in the more liberal age of the post 1960s would imbue younger people with the social values associated with the left?

This idea of a generational determinant, however, was challenged by a 2014 investigation by ScienceDirect[4]. Their findings revealed that voters in the past 100 years have revealed similar yearly ageing effects, with a net move to conservatism of 0.32-0.38% per annum. In other words, any category of voters within the last century (such as 18-28 year olds) has become 0.32-0.38% “more conservative” each year, regardless of whether they grew up in the post war years, the 1960s or the 1990s.

More compelling then is the explanation that it is the ageing process which endows us with more conservative values. An existing combination of the most socially liberal society the West has ever seen, and the highest number of young people going to university, means that Western Millennials are, by in large, the most socially enlightened generation in history. These values translate into a sense of justice which makes them more inclined to agree with left-wing social policies aimed at levelling the playing field, and hinged on a concern for all.

As we get older, factors such as rising tax obligations, finding a house and supporting a family can refocus our initially longsighted, morally ambitious horizons to a nearer prioritisation of those we care for. Human propensity for looking to the past with rose-tinted glasses also makes us more inclined to defend the status quo, again posing a shift to a conservative mentality. Of course not all of these issues, and in some cases none, affect all people, but movement along the political spectrum so evident in the statistics suggests that this is a fair interpretation of voting behaviour.

Despite the data seen earlier, however, there are signs that contemporary Millennials are upsetting this script. A 2015 YouGov article[5] noted that, whilst today’s students remain socially liberal, their stance on economic matters is in fact to the right of the general public. For example, 76% of the general public believe the minimum wage to be too low, compared with only 74% of students surveyed. Across the Channel, such a shift is being even more radically exposed by Marine Le Pen’s quite extraordinary levels of support amongst the young; by some estimates, her favourability is as much as 7 percentage points higher amongst the under 30s than amongst the overall population[6]. (With the upcoming election, this runs so starkly against the grain of current western European trends that Horizons shall be investigating French Millennial voting behaviour in a separate blog-piece soon).

Once again, the story is similar in America. Although Clinton held on to the under-30 vote, her victory dipped decisively from Obama’s over Romney in 2012 (60%-36%).



Accounting for this in a plausible manner is a far harder task due to the lack of consistency with other votes in Europe (look at Geert Wilders’ crashlanding in the Dutch elections and Alternative for Germany’s disappointing result in the Saarland state election). More significant to the risk in drawing overzealous conclusions is that it is an ongoing event, precluding the benefit of hindsight analysis, and so we do not yet know whether this is a momentary ‘blip’ or a long-term redirection in millennial voting habits.

Nevertheless, efforts are being made to explain modern political movements which may elucidate the reasons behind this change. A recent article in Vox[7] argued that the upshot of the gradual success of the welfare state system across Europe is that people are no longer so concerned about their economic stability. As a result, they are free to worry about other issues, for example immigration and national identity, which ushers them in the direction of nationalist parties such as UKIP and Front National. These parties’ lack of comprehensive, watertight economic policy does not deter their growing support, which crucially suggests that this is of less importance to supporters than their fortress-mentality nationalism.

Yet problems arise in rationalising recent millennial voting behaviour solely along these lines. Although the welfare system in Britain might give young people the assurance of a safety net which did not exist 100 years ago, an inaccessible housing market, rising student debts and real-term wage stagnation surely provide ample room for economic concern. The same can be said for France with its high unemployment rate. In this context, the suggestion that Millennials endure less financial strain than before the financial crash simply does not float.

This correlation with the worldwide rise of populism, however, cannot be ignored. In fact, compelling attention has been given to the implications of kickback against globalisation by an increasing number of voices, including the writer and environmentalist Paul Kingsnorth. He believes[8] globalisation – born in the 1980s and propelled into the 21st Century as the proclaimed zenith of capitalism – is seen by many as an abject failure in poverty alleviation. Amidst runaway inequality, most people feel like they have not shared in the benefits. So powerful is this sense of disillusionment that the traditional division between the left and right is being replaced by that between nationalism and globalism.

If this is taken to be true, the implication is that people can now be socially liberal and economically conservative, or the other way round. In extremis, Millennials could simultaneously subscribe to rights for gays, gender equality and climate change reducing measures, and at the same time favour a more defensive, nationally-minded economy, wary of the international titans hoarding the world’s wealth. What makes the ‘populism package’ so tractable in modern times is that it can absorb traditionally contradictory stances into one, anti-globalist front.

It is important not to get carried away with the impact of this shift. As the YouGov article notes, “This doesn't mean they [students/young people] tend to fall on the right-wing side of the debate, but simply that they fall on the left-wing side to a lesser extent”. Young people have still tended to the left in recent votes, but the signs are perhaps showing that this can no longer be taken for granted. As the alleged merits of an international ‘super-economy’ continue failing to reduce student debt, guarantee a job with a substantial salary or put a roof over heads, it remains to be seen whether Millennials – especially those highly educated and living in cosmopolitan areas - will start to trade in idealistic values for concerted action against this system.



[1] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36616028
[4] http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379413000875
[5] https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/08/18/students-profile/
[6] http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-election-fn-youths-idUKKBN16L139
[8] https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/mar/18/the-new-lie-of-the-land-what-future-for-environmentalism-in-the-age-of-trump